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ARTICLES

Economic Integration in the Americas:
"A Work in Progress",
Kenneth W. Abbott*
Gregory W. Bowman**

I. INTRODUCTION
Current political conditions in the United States, Canada and
Latin America 2 present an historic opportunity: to establish stable
and productive economic relations throughout the Western Hemisphere. From a United States perspective, several developments are
noteworthy. From the Rio Grande and Florida south to Tierra del
Fuego, more nations of Central America, South America and the Caribbean have elected democratic governments and are implementing
* Elizabeth Froehling Homer Professor of Law and Commerce, Northwestern University
School of Law.
** J.D. 1994, Northwestern University School of Law.
1 Expanding Hemispheric Trade is Seen as 'A Work in Progress', Int'l Trade Daily Rep.,
August 9, 1994, availablein LEXIS, Itrade Library, Intrad File (reporting remarks of Charles E.
Roh, Jr., Ass't U.S. Trade Representative for North American Affairs, to American Bar Association Annual Meeting on Aug. 8, 1994).
2 We use the term "Latin America" to include South America, Central America and the
Caribbean as well as, in contexts other than purely geographical, Mexico. This follows United
Nations nomenclature. See Nathaniel C. Nash, A Boom for the Few - A Special Report; Latin
Economic Speedup Leaves Poorin the Dust,N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 7,1994, at Al. We recognize that
this is an inappropriate designation for several nations in the Hemisphere, notably in the Caribbean, but felt it necessary to use the term to make references in the article manageable.
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free market reforms than at any time in memory. The nations of Latin
America are also evincing a strong desire for economic integration,
both within their own region and between Latin America and the
North. Economic integration has long been a goal of the Latin American states, but even there the explosion of new agreements and
groupings in the current decade is extraordinary. The strong Latin
American interest in integration with the United States and Canada
manifested since negotiations on a United States-Mexico free trade
agreement began in 1990 is something quite new, a sea change in attitude that makes new approaches possible.
Observed from a Latin American perspective, the situation looks
strikingly similar. The United States, too, is more open to economic
and political involvement with the South than at any time in memory.
Only two weeks after the United States-Mexico negotiations began,
President Bush put forward the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
(EAI), a package of proposals designed to support Latin American
economic reforms through programs in the areas of trade, investment
and indebtedness. The long-term goal of the trade program, perhaps
the principal pillar of the EAI, was a hemispheric free trade area? In
pursuit of that goal, the United States has already signed bilateral
framework agreements on trade and investment with virtually all
Latin American countries.4 The formation of NAFTA itself, designed
to integrate the economy of Mexico, a developing Latin American
country, with those of the United States and Canada, represents a
striking change in United States policy. The United States has also
granted non-reciprocal trade benefits, beyond the Generalized System
of Preferences, to the Caribbean 5 and Andean regions6 , and has
shown a willingness to address the potential diversion of trade from
the Caribbean to Mexico as a result of NAFTA.7
In short, the interests of the Hemisphere in democracy, free markets and economic integration now coincide to an unprecedented de3 For a concise summary of the EAI, see Jeffrey Schott & Gary Hufbauer, Free TradeAreas,
the Enterprisefor the Americas Initiative, and the Multilateral Trading System, in STRATEGIC
OPTIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA IN THE 1990s 249, 256-59 (Colin I. Bradford, Jr. ed., 1992).
4 Id. The exceptions are Cuba, Haiti, Surinam, and the Dominican Republic. For further
discussion of the framework agreements, see infra text accompanying notes 83-90.
5 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
6 Andean Trade Preference Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-06 (Supp. III 1991).
7 The Clinton Administration proposed to make NAFTA-equivalent import benefits available to most Caribbean nations as part of the bill to implement the results of the Uruguay
Round trade negotiations but withdrew the proposal because of serious concerns over it in the
Senate. Administration Submits GATT Legislation to Congress, Expects Approval in Weeks, 11
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1486 (Sept. 28, 1994).
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gree.8 It is important not to let this historic moment slip away. If the
nations of the Americas can maintain the current political and economic trends, they will stimulate substantial economic growth, helping
to raise the standard of living of the poor, often destitute, people of
Latin America. In the short run, perhaps even the medium run, income disparities and poor living conditions, exacerbated by the adjustment costs of market reforms, will continue to feed simmering social
tensions-like those reflected in the recent Chiapas uprising in Mexico-throughout Latin America. 9 In the long run, however, only
growth can alleviate the Hemisphere's grinding poverty. The promise
of economic integration between North and South is political as well:
It could replace decades of unequal interaction, suspicion and outright
hostility with cooperation based on common principles. The result
would be an unprecedented level of stability and security in this traditionally volatile region.
To capitalize most effectively on the present opportunity, the nations of the Hemisphere must create some enduring institutional
framework that can help reinforce and maintain the current political
and economic trends. Of course, economic integration in the Hemisphere is already proceeding rapidly, producing an alphanumeric blizzard of acronyms representing sub-regional organizations: NAFTA,
MERCOSUR, G-3, ANCOM, ACS. Yet many of the current efforts
are going forward without any clear idea of the overall goal or of the
best way to reach it. As a result, some of these efforts could later
prove counterproductive.
In December 1994, the democratically elected leaders of the
Hemisphere will meet in Miami at the invitation of the Clinton Administration in a "Summit of the Americas." This meeting, and the
series of consultations likely to result from it, is a perfect forum in
which to clarify the goals and modalities of hemispheric economic integration. This article is intended as a modest contribution to that
process.
In the next section of the article, we provide an overview of the
major subregional groupings and other institutional relationships now
being created throughout Latin America. In Section III, we suggest
two major goals that should guide the process of economic integration
in the Americas: maintaining the multilateral economic system as the
8 Beyond the regional interests discussed here, the nations of Latin America generally
joined with the United States and Canada in supporting the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. See Hobart Rowen, Giving Latin America a Lift, WASH. POST, July 8, 1990, at H1.
9 Nash, supra note 2, at Al.
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highest priority for the region and achieving regional integration at
the hemispheric level. We then outline the principal approaches to
economic integration currently being followed, or proposed, within
the region-including bilateral agreements, subregional groupings,
the expansion of NAFrA, and arrangements of continental scaleand assess these approaches as methods of achieving the stated goals.
In the final section of the article, we suggest a different approach: an
institutional mechanism that would take account of current political
and economic realities, yet set the Hemisphere firmly on the path to
economic integration within the multilateral economic system.
II.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION

Undoubtedly the most significant event in the recent history of
Western Hemisphere economic relations was the creation of NAFTA
in 1993.10 NAFTA is the largest trading community in the world, with
six trillion dollars in annual output-greater than the twelve nations
of the European Union-and affects almost every facet of international business within North America. It is the first major free trade
agreement between developed and developing countries, and it represents a striking reorientation of economic policy both for the United
States and Canada, on one hand, and for Mexico-formerly a heavily
statist economy and one of the more outspoken Latin American opponents of United States economic interference with the South-on
the other. The possibility of joining or associating with NAFTA has
acted as a powerful magnet throughout Central and South America
and the Caribbean, drawing one country after another to institute farreaching economic reforms.1
The general scope and coverage of NAFTA are well known, and
it is unnecessary to review them here. It is important, however, to
demonstrate that NAFTA is only one of many efforts at economic integration currently being pursued throughout the Hemisphere. Inte10 The North American Free Trade Agreement was signed in December 1992. President
Bush Signs NAFTA at Ceremony, 9 Ir'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 2162 (Dec. 23, 1992). The U.S.
House of Representatives approved implementing legislation in November 1993, and the Senate
followed suit later that month. After Presidential signature, the implementing legislation
brought the agreement into force for the United States as of January 1, 1994. See House Approval of NAFTA Seen CappingWeeks of Deal Making, 10 INr'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1976 (Nov.
24, 1993); NAFTA ClearsSenate by Margin of 61-38, 10 INr'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1973 (Nov. 24,
1993).
11 See, e.g., Juanita Darling, Spotlight on Trade: Latin American Countries Are Lining Up to
Be a Part of NAFTA; Hemisphere:Many Leaders See It as the Best Way to Revive a Foundering
Dream of Increased Intra-RegionalCommerce, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1993, at D1.
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gration has been a long-standing theme in Latin America, but the
current pace of activity is unprecedented even there. This section outlines the development and status of the major sub-regional economic
organizations in the Hemisphere, with special attention to their role in
broadening regional cooperation.
A. The Latin American Integration Association (ALADI)
In 1960, two years after the formation of the European Economic
Community, seven Latin American nations, later joined by four
others, 12 created the Latin American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA). 13 When its membership was complete, the organization included all the Spanish-speaking countries of South America, as well as
Brazil and Mexico. Like the former EEC, LAFTA was established to
promote economic development after the disruptions of World War II
and the Great Depression. It was quite consciously inspired by the
integrationist ideas surrounding the EEC. Unfortunately, LAFTA's
political mechanisms were insufficient to overcome the political and
economic differences among its members, and the hoped-for free
trade area never materialized. 4
TFwenty years later, the same eleven countries agreed to revitalize
the ideal of Latin American integration by replacing LAFTA with a
new organization, the Latin American Integration Association, known
by its Spanish acronym, ALADI.' s The Montevideo Treaty establishing ALADI set as a long-term goal "the gradual and progressive formation of a Latin American common market.' 6 The organization
utilizes several unusual approaches to achieve this goal. First, ALADI
has not eliminated tariffs among its members; instead, it has adopted a
system of preferential tariff reductions. Second, the treaty divides
member countries into three groups according to their stage of devel12

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay were the original mem-

bers; Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia joined them over the next several years. See

Lorin S. Weisenfeld, Introduction to Treaties of Montevideo Creating a Latin American FreeTrade Area and the Latin American Integration Association, 2 B.D.I.E.L. (CCH) 543 (Nov.

1989); William Andrews, Jr., Recent Trade Integration Efforts in Latin America, 1992 A.B.A.
SEC. INT'L L. & PAc.6 (prepared for a conference on "International Law and Business in the
Americas: The Critical Issues").
13 Treaty of Montevideo Establishing a Free-Trade Area and Instituting the Latin American

Free-TradeAssociation (LAFTA), 2 B.D.I.E.L. (CCH) 549 (Feb. 18, 1960).
14 See Andrews, supra note 12, at 6; Weisenfeld, supra note 12, at 542; LAN Assesses the
Woeful Lack of Regional Cooperation and Economic IntegrationAmong the Latin American
Countries Over the Past Twenty Years, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., May 9, 1986, at 4.

15 Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin American Integration Association, Aug. 12,
1980, 20 I.L.M. 672 (John R. Pate, trans. 1981) [hereinafter Treaty of Montevideo].
16 Id. art. 1.
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opment. Less developed members benefit from greater tariff preferences and other advantages.' 7 Third, ALADI has carried over from
LAFTA a clearing system for trade credits designed to minimize demands for foreign exchange.' 8
Most interesting for present purposes, however, is the emphasis
that ALADI places on "agreements of partial scope," bilateral or
minilateral agreements among some but not all members of the Association. 19 The Treaty seemingly assumes that more progress can be
made in bilateral and sub-regional associations than in ALADI itself.
It encourages sub-regional liberalization subject to a few important
norms, including (1) that sub-regional agreements must be open to the
adherence of other ALADI members, following negotiation and (2)
that such agreements must contain provisions that stimulate "convergence," in the sense of "progressive multilateralization ...

through

periodic negotiations among the member countries, as a function of
establishing the Latin American common market." 0 Seemingly independent economic integration arrangements like MERCOSUR and
the Andean Group are in fact agreements of partial scope within the
ALADI system. In spite of this emphasis, however, the members of
ALADI have recently considered proposals for moving more directly
toward a South American free trade zone. 2 '
B. The Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR)
Perhaps the most ambitious of the Western Hemisphere organizations, MERCOSUR was originally designed as a bilateral common
market between Argentina and Brazil, to be established within the
ALADI system.22 Uruguay and Paraguay, which trade extensively
with Argentina and Brazil, sought to be included, and the Common
Market of the South was established among these four nations by the
17 Ld.arts. 15-23; Weisenfeld, supra note 12, at 546.

18 See Andrews, supra note 12, at 9.
19 Treaty of Montevideo, supra note 15, arts. 7-14. The Treaty also authorizes associations

with non-members and with other economic integration areas within Latin America. Treaty of
Montevideo, supra note 15, arts. 24-25.

20 Treaty of Montevideo, supra note 15, art. 2(b).
21 Mario Lubetkin, Latin America: ALADI to Evaluate RegionalIntegration,Inter Press Service, Feb. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
22 Act of Buenos Aires, July 6, 1990, 15 INTERGRACI6N LAI NO AMERICANA 67 (1990), cited
in Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, An Analysis of the MERCOSUR Economic Integration Project

from a Legal Perspective, 28 INT'L LAWYER 439 (1994); Alfredo Rovira, South American Integration Within MERCOSUR, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. & PR4. 1-13 (prepared for a conference
on "International Law and Business in the Americas: The Critical Issues").
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Treaty of Asunci6n in 1991. The group accounts for some thirty-five
percent of intra-Latin American trade.24 The economic importance of
MERCOSUR would increase even further if Chile (currently a member only of ALADI) were to become a member. Chile originally refused to join on the ground that its market would be more open than
the others.2 Negotiations have continued, however, with consideration being given both to a separate free trade agreement and to full
Chilean membership. It now appears that the decision has been taken
in favor of membership.26
As its name suggests, the original goal of MERCOSUR was to
establish a full-fledged common market and to do so by 1995. In addition to the elimination of tariffs and nontariff barriers to trade necessary for a free trade zone and the establishment of a common external
tariff characteristic of a customs union, the Treaty of Asunci6n provided for the elimination of barriers to the movement of services, capital and workers, the coordination of macroeconomic and sectoral
policies, and the harmonization of national economic legislation, all by
December 31, 1994.27 The Treaty also called for "complementation
agreements" by which the member governments would rationalize regional industry in various economic sectors. In fact, however, while
some joint steps have been taken,28 economic and political instability
in Brazil (whose economy dominates the region), differences in
macroeconomic policy, trade imbalances, disagreements about a wide
range of issues, and the weakness of the MERCOSUR institutions
have made the goal of a common market unattainable, at least in the
short run.2 9
23 Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay-Uruguay: Treaty Establishing a Common Market, Mar. 26,
1991, 30 .L.M. 1041 (1991) [hereinafter Treaty of Asunci6n].
24 See Richard Bernal, Regional Trade Agreements in the Western Hemisphere, 8 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & PoL'Y 683, 702 (1993).

25 Schott & Hufbauer, supra note 3, at 262. Upon signing the Treaty, the foreign ministers of
the member countries adopted joint declarations encouraging closer ties with both Chile and
Bolivia. See Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 23, Declarations Nos. 2 and 3.
26 Chile Intends to Seek Membership in MERCOSUR, Foreign MinisterSays, 11 INT'L TRADE

REP. (BNA) 911 (June 8, 1994).
27 Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 23, arts. 1, 3-5, 8.
28 One complementation agreement, relating to steel production, has been reached. The
parties have developed common regulations on various customs matters as well as antidumping

and countervailing duties. Argentina and Brazil have agreed to permit the establishment of
binational companies. See O'Keefe, supra note 22, at 442; Rovira, supra note 22, at 12.
29 See O'Keefe, supra note 22, at 448; Bernal, supra note 25, at 702; Rovira, supra note 23, at
2-3; Uncas Fernandez, MERCOSUR Countries Delay Strides Toward Full Common Market,
Agence France Presse, Jan. 18, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Afpfr File; Latin
America and the Caribbean,DAILY REP. FOR EXECurvEs, Jan. 31, 1994, at 19.
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Instead, MERCOSUR has focused attention on the creation of a
modified customs union by the 1995 deadline. Internal tariffs have
largely been eliminated, if not always according to the time schedule
laid out in the treaty. In August 1994, the member countries agreed
on a common external tariff (CET) that is to take effect on January 1,
1995. 30 In fact, the agreement calls for a modified form of CET, one
that is less than fully "common". A cap will be placed on national
tariff rates, several important items will be excluded from this cap for
particular countries-the major issue has been Brazilian tariffs on
computers and telecommunications equipment-and extra time has
been given to phase these tariffs down to the standard cap.3 '
The Treaty of Asunci6n also deals with possible economic relationships between its members and other nations. Prior to 1995-the
end of the planned period of transition to a common market-members of MERCOSUR are required to avoid affecting the interests of
other members in any trade negotiations conducted with other
ALADI members. Even after the transition period, each member is
required to consult with the others if it engages in free trade area negotiations with other states in ALADI and to grant the other members most-favored-nation treatment in connection with any
agreements with non-ALADI members.3 2

C. The Andean Group or Andean Common Market (ANCOM)
The Andean Group was formed by the Cartagena Agreement of
1969. 3 3 The original members were Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru. Chile gradually dissociated itself from the Group in the
mid-1970s, as it began to implement market-oriented policies, and
withdrew in 1976. Venezuela became a member in 1973. 3 1 (This
lineup means that, of all the members of ALADI, only Chile and
Mexico do not belong either to MERCOSUR or to ANCOM.)
The original goals of ANCOM were to establish, by the end of
1980, a customs union and a form of managed common market in
which elements of important industrial sectors would be allocated
among the member countries so that each could achieve economies of
scale. In furtherance of the customs union, the Cartagena Agreement
set out timetables for the reduction of intra-group tariffs and the es30 See Tariff Accord by Latin Group, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 5, 1994, at D15.
31 See O'Keefe, supra note 22, at 442-43.

32 Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 23, art. 8(d).
33 Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910 (1969).
34 See Igor I. Kavass, Grupo Andino and Its Documents, 16 INr'L J. LEGAL INFO. 83 (1988).
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tablishment of a CET. 5 ANCOM is certainly best known, however,
for its common policies on incoming foreign direct investment and the
protection of intellectual property. Decision 24, issued in 1970, established one of the most restrictive direct investment schemes in the
world. This approach was based on the theory of import substitution,
and was tainted with nationalistic hues.36 It was also designed to
complement plans for the allocation of industry among member
states; foreign investors thus might be refused permission to locate
their investments where they could earn the highest returns.3 7
ANCOM's early ambitious plans mainly ended in failure. The
lack of foreign investment kept needed capital in short supply; import
substitution did not produce the desired development.3 8 Trade within
the region grew little if at all. In addition, the members of ANCOM
found it very difficult to cooperate politically and even technically in
the implementation of the group's ambitious goals 3 9 Formation of
the common market was officially postponed.
ANCOM survived these setbacks, and a fresh start was made at
the beginning of the 1990s. In line with the turn to the market in
other regions of the world, the Andean Group liberalized its approach
to foreign investment, first by Decision 220, which attempted to give
member countries greater flexibility within a framework of common
and still restrictive rules; then by Decision 291,40 which gives much
greater leeway and establishes such principles as national treatment
and free remittance of returns.4" At a series of annual meetings, the
Presidents of the ANCOM members set 1992 as the new date for completion of a modified customs union, with various phase-in procedures
to be completed by 1994. Member states were encouraged to
strengthen intellectual property protection. Members agreed to eliminate competitive export subsidies and began to consider means of harmonizing economic policy.4' In response to these developments, the
35 Andrews, supra note 12, at 11.
36 Sebastian Perez Areta, Andean Pact Developments, 7 FLA.J.INT'L L. 113 (1992).
37 Schott & Hufbauer, supra note 3, at 260.
38 Perez Areta, supra note 36, at 113-14; Eduardo Wiesner, ANCOM: A New Attitude Toward ForeignInvestment?, 24 INTER-AMERCAN L. REv.435, 437 (1993).
39 Kavass, supra note 34, at 83-84; Andrews, supra note 12, at 12.
40 Common Code for the Treatment of Foreign Capital and on Trademarks, Patents,
Licenses and Royalties, Decision 291, Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, Mar. 21, 1991,
30 LL.M. 1283 (1991).
41 Perez Areta, supra note 36, at 114-115; Wiesner, supra note 38, at 446-48.
42 See Declarationof Barahona,1992 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. & PRAc.(presented at the conference on "International Law and Business in the Americas: The Critical Issues") [hereinafter
Declaration].
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United States Congress enacted the Andean Trade Preferences Act in
December 1991. 41
Unfortunately, as in prior years, political and economic differences have kept the Andean Group from realizing the promise of its
new arrangements. 44 Politically, the upheavals in the region caused by
President Fujimori's suspension of democratic processes in Peru paralyzed ANCOM. Economically, the less developed members of the
Group balked at the process of trade liberalization; Ecuador and Peru
refused to enter the free trade area as the 1992 deadline approached.45
The Andean Group continues to work toward its ultimate goals, however; in 1993, for example, it signed a memorandum of understanding
with the Commission of the European Union for technical assistance
46
on customs reform and other aspects of economic integration.
Like ALADI and MERCOSUR, ANCOM has been very concerned with its relationship to the overall process of Latin American
economic integration. The Declaration of Barahona, a 1991 joint decision of the Andean Group's Presidents that was a crucial element in
the revitalization of ANCOM, included several provisions on this
score. 47 For one thing, the Presidents placed Andean integration in

the context of broader forms of integration. They specifically called
for a hemispheric zone of free trade to be completed by the end of
the 1990s; in fact, however, it appears that the real goal is a Latin
American free trade area.48 They also authorized ANCOM members
to negotiate, individually or as a bloc, trade arrangements with other
ALADI members or with Central American or Caribbean states. At
the same time, the Presidents encouraged the development of closer
relations with the United States49under the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and with Europe.
D. The Group of 3 (G-3)
The Group of 3, consisting of Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico,
has been one of the fastest-growing subregional organizations within
43 Andean Trade Preference Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3206 (Supp. II 1991).
44 Sarita Kendall, Andean Common Market Failsto Deliver, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1992, at 7.

45 Andrews, supra note 12, at 13-14.
46 EUAndean Pact: Conference Woos European Investors to New Andean Market, [1993]
Eur. Rep. (Predicasts), No. 1905, § V (Nov. 27, 1993).
47 Declaration,supra note 42, art. HI.

48 The more specific sections of the Declaration refer to the formation of a Latin American
Economic Zone; the provisions authorizing negotiations seem to focus exclusively on Latin
American countries. Declaration,supra note 42, art. HI(A).
49 Declaration,supra note 42, art III(B)-(C).
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Latin America. 50 With a total population of some 140 million, the
region is responsible for almost one-third of Latin America's total
GDP."' The emergence of the G-3 is largely the result of ANCOM's
weakness. In 1992, concerned by the ability of the smaller members
of ANCOM to block progress within that organization, Colombia and
Venezuela negotiated a bilateral free trade agreement within the legal
frameworks of ALADI and ANCOM. It was hoped that Mexico
could join the free trade area in the same year.52 In fact, however, a
G-3 free trade agreement was not signed until 1994. If ratified by the
three parties, this treaty would phase out tariffs on all goods, in most
cases over ten years.53 Recent economic difficulties in Venezuela,
however, could disrupt the adoption and implementation of the
treaty. 4
Like the other Latin American economic organizations, the G-3
is concerned with broader regional integration. Institutionally, the G3 agreement includes a clause providing procedures for the accession
of new members and for establishing economic links with other countries and organizations in the region.55 Politically, the leaders of the
G-3 countries have been outspoken in their desire to expand the
membership and economic relationships of the Group of 3. As former
Colombian President Cesar Gavarilla Trujillo, now Secretary-General
of the OAS, remarked, for example, the G-3 "is not a group to form
closed trade blocks... We hope that other countries of the Caribbean
and Latin America will link to this accord that we in the G-3 have
signed. ' 6
E. The Central American Common Market (CACM)
Efforts to integrate the tiny economies of Central America go
back many years. Modern efforts began in 1958, and in 1960 Guate50
Rep.,
51
52

Maria Jos6 Gonzalez, LATAM Leaders Optimistic on Regional Integration, Reuters Bus.
Oct. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Reubus File.
Group of Three Agrees Programme,LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., Dec. 16, 1993, at 579.
Andrews, supra note 12, at 14.

53 G-3 Accord Poses Few Problems for U.S. Subsidiaries,Experts Say, 11 INT'L TRADE REp.

(BNA) 1051 (June 15,1994); Free Trade Pact Signed by "Group of Three", 11 INT'L TRADE RIP.
(BNA) 945 (June 15, 1994). James Brooke, In Latin America, A Free Trade Rush, N.Y. Times,

June 13, 1994, at Dl.
54 This is particularly the case because of the Venezuelan government's interventionist response, which includes a form of exchange controls. James Brooke, Venezuela's Tight Grip Has
Investors Gasping, N.Y. TmsS, Aug. 19, 1994, at D1.
55 The G-3 has already established a variety of relations with countries in Central America,
the Caribbean and elsewhere. See infra text accompanying notes 65, 73-77.
56 Gonzalez, supra note 50.
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mala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua signed the General
Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, establishing the
Central American Common Market.57 Costa Rica adhered to the
treaty three years later,5" though Honduras dropped out in 1969. 59
This ambitious treaty envisioned a customs union, a regime for balancing regional development through the designation of "integrated
industries", and macroeconomic coordination. Unfortunately, revolution, war and other political problems, as well as economic imbalances
and disruptions, meant that little was accomplished; 6 indeed, the
Common Market essentially collapsed near the end of the 1970s.61
In 1990, the Central American nations issued a sweeping Economic Action Plan designed to rekindle the integration movement. In
1991, they agreed to establish a new common market. (Costa Rica did
not join in the plan, as it was opposed to the liberalization of immigration; by that time, however, Panama was a member of the group.) As
a first step, they began to reduce quotas and other trade barriers in
the agriculture sector. The new plan ultimately envisioned a CET system with a range of tariff caps, rules guaranteeing free movement of
persons and capital, and liberalized trade in services.
Progress in implementing this vision has been rather slow.62 In
the meanwhile, though, the three northern Central American nations-Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras-have agreed to their
own FTA, the "Triangle of the North", building on earlier bilateral
agreements. 61 This flurry of activity has quite openly been inspired by
the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and the expressed United
States preference for negotiating with regional groups rather than individual states.6
The Central American countries have also been looking to the
larger region. In February 1993, the G-3 agreed to establish a free
trade zone with the Central American group. And in 1992, the five
negotiated a framework agreement with Mexico under which each of
them will establish bilateral free trade relations with Mexico, with the
57 General Treaty on CentralAmerican Economic Integration,2 B.D.I.E.L. (CCH) 529 (Dec.
13, 1960). See Lorin S. Weisenfeld, Introductionto General Treaty on CentralAmerican Economic Integration,2 B.D.I.E.L. (CCH) 525 (Nov. 1989).
58 Weisenfeld, supra note 57, at 525.
59 CentralAmerican Countries Sign Accords in Preparationfor Trade Pact with U.S., 8 INr'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 911 (Nov. 6, 1991) [hereinafter CentralAmerican Countries].

60
61
62
63
64

Weisenfeld, supra note 57, at 526.
Schott & Hufbauer, supra note 3, at 261.
See Bernal, supra note 24, at 703.
CentralAmerican Countries,supra note 59, at 912; Andrews, supra note 12, at 15.
Central American Countries,supra note 59, at 912.
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hope that all the agreements can be rolled into a single multilateral
FTA by 1996.65
F. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
In 1973, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago
established the Caribbean Community under the Treaty of Chaguaramas. 66 Nine additional English-speaking nations in the Caribbean basin joined the treaty within a year.6 CARICOM replaced the
Caribbean Free Trade Association, which itself followed two earlier,
largely unsuccessful efforts at Caribbean integration. 6 The goal of
CARICOM has been to create a form of common market, with a CET
and common rules of origin.69 Over a ten year period, most member
countries adopted the agreed CET, with a range of duties from five to
forty-five percent. In general, however, real progress toward economic integration has been halting at best, in large part because of the
daunting economic conditions throughout the region.70 Deadlines for
the establishment of the customs union, and thus the common market,
have been repeatedly missed.7 ' Much of CARICOM's energies have
been devoted to obtaining duty-free access for its exports to the
United States market, under the GSP and Caribbean Basin Initiative,
and defending that
access from trade diversion caused by the comple72
tion of NAFTA.

The CARICOM countries are so small that, by themselves, economic integration can achieve rather little. Recognizing this, the Caribbean nations began early in the 1990s to broaden their economic
links with other countries in the region. They granted observer status
65 Damian Fraser, Mexico Links with New Trade Zone: A Framework Pact for Central
America, FIN. TIMEs, Aug. 26, 1992, at 15; Andrews, supra note 12, at 15.
66 Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community (Caricom), July 4, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1033

(1973).
67 See Lorin S. Weisenfeld, Introductionto Treaty Establishingthe CaribbeanCommunity, 2
B.D.I.E.L. (CCH) 643 (Nov. 1989).
68 Wendell Samuel, Integraci6nEcon6mica en el Caribe,INrEGRACI6N LAT-NOAMERICANA 7

(1990), cited in Sharon Bowden & Martin Elling, In the Shadow of 1992: Developing Country
Efforts at Economic Integration,32 HARV. INT'L LJ. 537,539 (1991); Mark Baker & Jaime Toro-

Monserrate, CBI v. CARICOM The Interplay Between Two InternationalLaw Instruments, 11
N.C. J. INrr'L L. & CoM. 1, 2 (1986).

69 See Caribbean Common Market, Annex to Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1044 (1973).
70 Andrews, supra note 12, at 15, Bowden & Elling, supra note 68, at 539; Schott & Huf-

bauer, supra note 3, at 262.
71 Schott & Hufbauer, supra note 3, at 262.
72 Schott & Hufbauer, supra note 3, at 262; CBI Nations Want NAFTA Parity for Leather,
Petroleum Goods, 11 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 912 (June 8, 1994).
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to the G-3 countries, then signed an agreement with the G-3 calling
for closer economic, cultural, and political links. Venezuela then requested full membership in 1991 and negotiated one-way duty-free
entry for CARICOM exports. Colombia and CARICOM reached
agreement on an FTA in 1994. 73 The Caribbean states also began consultations with the members of the CACM.
These efforts culminated in July 1994 with the signing of an agreement establishing the framework for a much larger regional grouping,
the Association of Caribbean States (ACS). 74 The ACS is to include
twenty-five independent nations that share the Caribbean Sea; another twelve dependent territories are to be associate members. The
ACS includes the members of the G-3, the CACM, and CARICOM,
as well as a few unaffiliated nations, notably Cuba 75 and the Dominican Republic.76 The ACS countries encompass 200 million people and
have a total GDP of 500 billion dollars, expanding the economic opportunities manyfold.77 In addition to economic integration, the
agreement also provides for scientific, social, political and cultural cooperation, a tall order in an extremely diverse region.
III.

PRINCIPLES AND APPROACHES

The foregoing discussion reveals that-despite the frenetic pace
at which integration arrangements are being pursued throughout
Latin America-relatively little attention is being paid to the overall
goal of this activity for Latin America, the Western Hemisphere, or
the international economic system.
Some efforts, like the ACS, are predominantly local. A number
of arrangements incorporate the ideal of Latin American integration,

at least in principle, though few are structured to achieve it. Indeed,
sub-regional groupings, with their potential centrifugal effect, are
growing increasingly strong. NAFTA operates in a rhetorical climate
of Western Hemisphere integration but remains rooted in North
America. Lack of a consensus, at least at a general level, on the economic and political relationships that the nations of the Hemisphere
73 Colombia and CARICOM Conclude Negotiationson Trade Accord, 11 INT'L TRADE REP.

(BNA) 993 (June 22, 1994).
74 Caribbean: Region Forms Fourth Biggest Economic Bloc, Inter Press Service, July 25,
1994, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File [hereinafter Caribbean];CaribbeanStates
Sign Regional Cooperation Pact,11 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1179 (July 27, 1994).
75 The ACS is the first regional group to admit Cuba since its membership in the OAS was
suspended in 1962. Caribbean,supra note 74.
76 CaribbeanStates Sign Regional Cooperation Pact,supra note 74, at 1179.
77 Caribbean,supra note 74.
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collectively wish to create has several unfortunate consequences.
Most obviously, without a consensus on goals there can be no agreement on the strategies or modalities by which such goals should be
achieved. The energies of the participants are diffused among various
approaches, increasing the likelihood that they will collectively fail to
grasp the historic opportunity currently presented to them. Similarly,
without a broad agreement on goals, it becomes much more difficult
to design and put in place an institutional framework that can effectively harness the region's desire for economic integration. As noted
in the Introduction, without collective aims and strategies, some current efforts may even prove to be counterproductive.
In the remainder of this section, we propose two broad principles
to guide integrationist activity in the Western Hemisphere. Given the
lack of intellectual or political consensus in the region at the present
stage, it does not seem appropriate to spell out a more detailed program. We then use these principles to analyze the approaches to economic integration now being followed, or proposed, within the
Western Hemisphere. As this discussion will demonstrate, the broad
general principles we advance have considerable analytic power and
show many current efforts to be wanting.
A. Principles
The first principle we recommend is not a purely hemispheric
goal at all. Rather, in spite of the undoubted excitement of regional
and subregional initiatives, we urge that support for the multilateral
trading system remain the highest priority for the Americas. Economic integration within the Western Hemisphere will be a hollow
promise if it leads the Americas to turn inward, closing their eyesand borders-to Asia, Europe and other economically significant regions of the world. Latin America already trades extensively with
these areas, and such trade must continue to expand if the region is to
reach its full economic potential.7" In terms of economic policy, then,
regional economic arrangements must at least maintain, and if possible increase, the existing degree of national openness to extra-Latin
American and extra-hemispheric trade, so that foreign markets will
remain equally open for Latin American exports. In terms of law, the
nations of the hemisphere must take no actions, jointly or unilaterally,
that would tend to undercut the norms or institutions of the evolving
78 Cf. Schott & Hufbauer, supra note 3, at 249.
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multilateral system and must observe those rules and procedures by
which the system regulates economic integration itself.
What is more, the governments of the Americas must continue to
devote time and attention to the development of the multilateral system. In the Uruguay Round trade negotiations, the nations of Latin
America generally cooperated with those of North America, supporting such important changes as a phase-out of the Multifiber Agreement, a safeguards agreement, and liberalization of markets for
agricultural and manufactured goods. The Round also created a new
World Trade Organization and a strengthened and unified dispute resolution system, of which smaller countries like those of Latin America
could be the greatest beneficiaries. 79 Even though the negotiations
are complete, however, there is still much to be done. The results of
the Round must be brought into the national law of 112 signatories;
numerous details, such as the harmonization of rules of origin, must
still be worked out; the new institutions must be put into operation;
and the rules must be applied, tested and interpreted. In addition,
complex issues like competition law and the link between trade and
environmental protection are already on the agenda for future negotiations. Dealing with these multiple demands sometimes strains the
resources even of the United States, but no nation in the Western
Hemisphere can afford to let the multilateral system decline.
The second principle, we recommend is that integrationist activity
throughout Latin American be aimed at achieving economic integration on a hemispheric scale. In other words, integration should not be
pursued as a Latin American or North American enterprise; far less
should it be merely a sub-regional undertaking, covering only parts of
Latin America. The reasons for this position are varied and powerful.
First, hemispheric integration promises greater economic benefits
than integration on a smaller scale, whether regional or sub-regional.
A hemispheric arrangement would include a varied set of national
economies having a much greater degree of complementarity than any
smaller grouping could provide. While differing market structures
and levels of development may create difficult adjustment problems,
economic complementarity is also a central characteristic of many successful regional groupings.80 Hemispheric arrangements would also
79 Schott & Hufbauer, supra note 3, at 264.
80 Complementarity is seen as a particular advantage of many sub-regional arrangements in
Asia. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Gregory W. Bowman, Economic Integration for the Asian
Century: An Early Look at New Approaches, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTMP. PROB. 187, 193,

194-95, 198, 200-01 (1994).
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provide greater opportunities for specialized intra-industry trade-the
sort of economic activity that characterizes United States-European
relations 8 -among the industrial sectors of nations like Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, the United States, and Canada. For both reasons,
economic integration of hemispheric scope is likely to produce a
larger degree of efficient trade creation relative to the degree of inefficient trade diversion than any narrower arrangements could provide.
Apart from their obvious importance to the prosperity of the Americas, the beneficial economic effects of such large-scale integration
would align hemispheric arrangements more closely with the global
efficiency and welfare goals of the multilateral trading system.
A second set of reasons is political. Hemispheric integration
would join together, in a community of common principles and institutions, nations and groups of nations that have in the past been suspicious, antagonistic, even hostile in their economic relations.' Such
unity would be of significant benefit to Latin America, where economic, political and even military conflict have been long-standing
facts of life. The most obvious effect of hemispheric integration, however, would be to join the Anglos of the North with the Latinos of the
South, as NAFTA was able to do in North America. The process of
integration across such political and ethnic divides is undeniably difficult, as Mexico and the United States are beginning to learn. But the
benefits can be tremendous. After all, the core of the original European Economic Community was an attempt to link the traditional enemies France and Germany in common economic arrangements.
B.

Assessment of Current Approaches

What, then, of the legal/political modalities by which the goals of
hemispheric integration consistent with the multilateral system can be
achieved? At present, the nations of the Hemisphere are following
several different approaches. Each of these, however, presents serious
81 Jeremy Clegg, Intra-industry Foreign Direct Investment A Study of Recent Evidence, in
STRucrURAL CHANGE INTHE WORLD ECONOMY 114 (Allan Webster and John H. Dunning eds.,

1990); David Greenaway, Patterns of Intra-Industry Trade in the United Kingdom, in IrrRA141 (P.K.M. Tharakan ed.,

INDUSTRY TRADE: EMPIRICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS

1983).
82 Even today, law students are taught the different attitudes of nations toward expropriation
of foreign investment through the diplomatic correspondence of the 1930s between Secretary of
State Hull and the Mexican government with regard to the Mexican expropriations between
1915 and 1940. See HENRY J. STEINER, DETLEV F. VAGTS & HAROLD HONGou KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMs 455-65 (4th ed. 1994).
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problems in light of our two principles for regional economic
integration.
1. BilateralAgreements
A number of nations in Latin America have been vigorously negotiating bilateral trade and investment agreements with other states
in the region. We have already seen, for example, the bilateral agreement between Colombia and Venezuela within ANCOM, and the
framework agreement designed to produce a series of bilaterals between the Central American states and Mexico. Chile, which currently belongs to no subregional grouping other than ALADI, has
relied exclusively on a bilateral policy: Its free trade agreement with
Mexico was the first such agreement under ALADI, and it also has
bilateral commercial agreements with Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela,
and Colombia.83 Costa Rica has also pursued an active bilateral policy.8 4 The champion in this regard is probably Colombia, which will
have some two dozen bilateral economic agreements by the time this
article appears. 85 In fact, according to one Latin American authority,
there currently exist bilateral trade agreements "involving virtually
every pair of countries within the hemisphere ....
The United States too has engaged in extensive bilateral negotiations with the nations of Latin America in connection with EAI. To
date, these negotiations have focused on creating a series of "framework" agreements on trade and investment. As of 1993, the United
States had entered into sixteen such agreements covering a total of
thirty-one countries; most were bilateral, although one was with
MERCOSUR and one with CARICOM.1 The framework agreements, however, only set the stage and the agenda for further talks;
they accomplish little of substance in the short run. Each agreement
includes a statement of general principles, dealing with, for example,
the benefits of open trade and protection for intellectual property.
Each also establishes a Trade and Investment Council (TIC), chaired
by the United States Trade Representative or his delegate. The TIC is
a forum for general consultations-on matters relating to the Uruguay Round, for example-and for negotiations over specific trade
83 Schott & Hufbauer, supra note 3, at 257, 259; Bernal, supra note 25, at 707.
84 Andrews, supra note 12, at 17-18.

85 Brooke, supra note 53, at D1.
86 Bernal, supra note 24, at 706.
87 Departmentof Commerce Market Report on the Western Hemisphere: Enterprisefor the
Americas, Nat'l Mkt. Rep., Jan. 15, 1993, availablein LEXIS, World Library, Mktrpt File [hereinafter Western Hemisphere: Enterprisefor the Americas].
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and investment problems, as well as a way to monitor bilateral
relations.88
Eventually, a complete network of bilateral agreements could
lead to hemispheric integration in harmony with the multilateral system. But this approach has serious problems. For one thing, American states are not pursuing this approach at the same rate. Colombia
may have many agreements, making it something of an economic hub
among the spokes of its bilaterals, but cross-agreements among its
treaty partners are being reached more slowly and unevenly. What is
more, no guarantee exists that the bilateral negotiating process will
produce consistent agreements, as would be necessary to create a
hemispheric solution from a network of bilaterals8 9 Even the United
States Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) program, in which the
world's strongest economy prepared a model treaty and attempted to
replicate it in bilateral negotiations, has produced inconsistencies; the
differences between the United States BITs and those negotiated by
European countries are even more significant. 90
Finally, the bilateral treaty route to hemispheric integration is extremely complex, time-consuming and costly. Much as the Reciprocal
Trade Agreements program of bilateral treaties was succeeded by the
more centralized multilateral tariff negotiations of the 1947 Geneva
Conference, at which the GATT was drafted, and ultimately by the
more institutionalized negotiating forum of GATT itself, the scope
and efficiency of hemispheric negotiations would be increased if the
diffuse and complex system of bilateral agreements were replaced by a
more centralized multilateral approach utilizing a common forum.
2.

Regional Groupings

By far the most notable approach to integration in the Americas
is the creation of regional and sub-regional groupings, the most important of which were described in Section II. At this stage, NAFTA is
the best known and most advanced of the hemisphere's regional
88 Id.
89 The United States government, under EAI, shares the goal of a hemispheric free trade
area, and counts on bilateral as well as plurilateral agreements to accomplish this. The United
States clearly understands, however, that such agreements will have to be made consistent in
their coverage and terms with each other, with NAFTA, and with the multilateral trading system.

Id.
90 See, e.g., Herbert Golsong, Introductory Note to Argentina-United States: Treaty Con-

cerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M.
124 (1992) (discussing differences between United States-Argentina BIT signed in November
1991 and those signed by Argentina with European nations).
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groups. In the South, the present groupings vary substantially in size
and influence, geographic scope, ambitiousness of economic goals,
political and administrative effectiveness, and attitudes toward expansion. ALADI, for example, is a broad but shallow grouping; though it
includes virtually all of the major economies of Latin America, it has
produced limited economic integration on its own, deferring to bilateral and sub-regional arrangements. NAFTA and MERCOSUR, on
the other hand, have relatively limited memberships but aim for
sweeping economic liberalization and integration. The economically
powerful Group of 3 is explicitly structured and administered around
the goal of geographic expansion, while the economically marginal
CACM has a much more local vision.
Clearly, if one of these groupings were to expand through the
admission of enough new members to encompass the entire Hemisphere, or if the various groupings were gradually able to consolidate,
the current regional integration movement could be a route to a hemispheric solution. Many have hoped to see NAFTA follow the expansion strategy, gradually incorporating additional members from Lafin
America. The expressed United States interest in negotiating NAFTA
affiliations with groups of states rather than individual countries has
even raised the possibility that regional or sub-regional blocs could be
admitted, or associated, as a unit.9 1 ALADI adopts the consolidation
strategy in its emphasis on convergence and progressive multilateralization among the various sub-regional groupings of Latin America;
and a form of consolidation can be seen in the free trade zone agreed
to by the G-3 and CACM. Another version of consolidation can be
seen in the bilateral relationships that individual Latin American
countries have formed with sub-regional groups. Chile's affiliation
with MERCOSUR may take this form; another example is the CARICOM-Colombia FTA that helped pave the way for the formation of
the ACS.
It will be very difficult, however, to achieve hemispheric integration through the expansion or consolidation of existing groups. Experience to date suggests that it takes a tremendous amount of time,
effort and political will to successfully implement a regional economic
arrangement, or even to create one. The difficulty that many Latin
American organizations have had in adhering to their original schedules and attaining their original ambitions attests to this problem.
Even a long-standing, well-defined organization like ANCOM has
been unable to bring its own members along at the same rate. Ex91 See Western Hemisphere: Enterprisefor the Americas, supra note 87.
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panding and consolidating regional groupings will pose similar difficulties. Inconsistencies between blocs, like those mentioned above,
will make consolidation and expansion all the more difficult. This
problem may become even more severe over time, as the regimes of
individual groups become more detailed and more deeply embedded
in national policy and bureaucratic organization. Thus, even if all the
American regional groupings were open to further expansion and liberalization, the process would likely be difficult, slow, and uncertain,
especially with no institutional framework to help coordinate moves
toward a hemispheric solution.
What is more, relatively few of the existing regional or sub-regional blocs could realistically serve as a base for hemispheric integration. NAFTA, because of its economic influence and the present
expectations of many in Latin America, could certainly perform that
function. But it is difficult to imagine the United States and Canada
joining MERCOSUR, ANCOM, or the G-3, and even difficult to imagine NAFTA consolidating with one of those groups as equals to
form a hemispheric entity. In any case, none of the Latin American
organizations-not even expansionist groups like the G-3-aspires to
be the cornerstone of a hemispheric arrangement.
The gradual expansion of NAFTA-an approach on which many
in the Hemisphere are relying-is in many ways the best hope for the
regional strategy. But even this approach is fraught with difficulty.
For one thing, it seems clear that a substantial expansion of NAFTA
will take many years, if indeed it takes place at all. The experience of
Chile is instructive. Chile has been first in line to link up with
NAFTA for several years. In May 1992, after Chile had negotiated
the first bilateral debt reduction and the first investment sector loan
under the EAI, President Bush announced the United States' intention to negotiate a comprehensive FTA with Chile, to be approved
under fast-track procedures, as soon as NAFTA itself was concluded. 92 Yet at the time of this writing, with 1995 just around the
corner, action on the Chilean FTA has not yet been taken and the
fast-track procedure has lapsed, at least temporarily. Even the Bush
Administration acknowledged that progress towards hemispheric free
trade would likely take a decade or more to achieve. 93 The opposition that has since surfaced both to NAFTA and to the Uruguay
Round accords suggest that even this forecast may have been
optimistic.
92 See Western Hemisphere: Enterprisefor the Americas, supra note 87.
93 Western Hemisphere: Enterprisefor the Americas, supra note 87.
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Quite apart from the political obstacles to expansion, the substantive requirements set by the United States for FTAs with or accession
to NAFTA are at present simply too demanding for many Latin
American states to consider. The Bush Administration identified severai indicators of readiness that it planned to use in judging whether
a particular country qualified for an FTA or NAFTA accession. These
included, in addition to being a GATT member in good standing,
whether a state was committed to a stable macroeconomic environment and market-oriented policies and whether it had already recorded progress in achieving an open trade regime.9 4 (As Schott and
Hufbauer observe, by the time these conditions are met, most of the
benefits of an FTA will already have been achieved.) 95 Both Congress 96 and the Executive Branch 97 have since set out more detailed
negotiating objectives for FTAs or NAFTA accession agreements that
cover the entire range of economic issues dealt with in NAFTAfrom tariff elimination to protection of investors to intellectual property protection, as well as non-traditional issues like environmental
protection and worker rights-and require substantial concessions
leading to a balance of rights and obligations on both sides. 98
Perhaps the biggest problem with the expansion of NAFTA strategy is the absence of satisfactory procedures for dealing with Latin
American countries and sub-regional groupings that are not yet ready
to consolidate with NAFTA or that, like Chile are simply waiting for
action. Such countries will remain in contact with the United States
through its network of bilateral framework agreements. But there is
no institutional forum or procedure through which they can continue
to work with each other, and with the United States, toward the goal
of hemispheric integration. While waiting for NAFTA, these countries will have to make do with the existing economic associations and
the possibility that those groupings can expand or consolidate.
The danger of relying on the evolution of existing arrangements
in Latin America, however, is that this approach could just as easilyindeed much more easily-leave the Hemisphere broken up into a
patchwork quilt of regional and sub-regional blocs. It would be unfortunate if this kind of division were the ultimate result of all the effort
94 See Western Hemisphere: Enterprisefor the Americas, supra note 87. An additional criterion was whether the state had the economic and institutional capacity to fulfill a serious, longterm economic commitment.
95 Schott & Hufbauer, supra note 3, at 251.
96 'The North American Free Trade Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3317 (Supp. V 1993).
97 Western Hemisphere: Enterprisefor the Americas, supra note 87.
98 See Western Hemisphere: Enterprisefor the Americas, supra note 87.
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devoted to integration in recent years. Outside of NAFTA, and perhaps also MERCOSUR (including Chile), virtually all of these blocs
would be of substantially less than optimal size in an economic sense.
The costs of doing business throughout the hemisphere would remain
high, not only because of the remaining tariffs and other controls on
international trade and investment, but also because of the inevitable
differences among blocs in economic regulation, standards, and
practices.
A collection of regional and sub-regional blocs would almost certainly entail greater conflict with the goals and procedures of the multilateral trading system than an arrangement of hemispheric scope.
Perhaps most significant of all, a patchwork outcome would fall short
of bridging the major political divides in the Hemisphere, particularly
the North-South divide. Finally, an approach based on regional and
sub-regional groups would provide no over-arching set of principles or
institutions-save the Organization of American States (OAS), which
to date has not played a prominent role in regional integration or
other economic matters 9 9-to facilitate further development toward a
hemispheric solution.
3.

ContinentalIntegration

The economic integration of Latin America, or of South America
alone, has been a powerful concept, even an ideal, for many years.
This ideal inspired the formation of LAFTA in 1960, and it is the explicitly stated goal of LAFTA's successor ALADI today. As amended
in 1967, the Charter of the OAS contains a commitment to accelerate
the integration process, with a view to establishing a Latin American
common market in the shortest possible time." o Due to the efforts of
Colombia and Venezuela, even ANCOM-which for most of its life
has had a narrow geographic perspective -now sees itself as part of a
movement toward Latin American integration. MERCOSUR-in
some ways the least continental of the major Latin American groupings' 01 -has seriously considered a Brazilian proposal for the creation
99 See generally 0.
1993).

CARLOS STOETZER, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

(2d ed.

100 Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, art. 41, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
2424, 119 U.N.T.S. 4, 20.
101 The provisions of the Treaty of Asunci6n dealing with member state negotiations on economic integration outside of MERCOSUR itself are designed primarily to ensure that other

members are not hurt by, and even benefit from, such external arrangements. These provisions
have acted as a brake on broader negotiations by MERCOSUR members. See supra text accompanying note 32.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

14:493 (1994)

of a South American Free Trade Association (ALCSA in Spanish and
Portuguese) by 2005.102 In addition, the 1994 meeting of Ibero-American heads of state and government called for the creation of a Latin
American free trade zone through consolidation of existing blocs.10 3
Continental integration in North America is a more recent ideal, but
one that is already reality, because of NAFTA. The continental scale
and conception of this arrangement may create perceptual barriers to
further expansion.
Integration on a continental scale would produce some of the
same economic advantages of scope as a hemispheric solution. The
benefits, however, would be substantially reduced if the economies of
the United States and Canada were not integrated with those of Latin
America. Furthermore, a continental approach would forego many of
the political benefits of hemispheric integration. Even the process of
preparing for integration on a hemispheric scale would produce important connections, expose common interests, build common institutions, allow for harmonization of perceptions and regulations and
otherwise begin to build bridges between North and South. None of
this would take place, however, if the attention of North and South
America were focused on continental integration.
Indeed, continental integration might reinforce the currently eroding North-South gap by setting the two regions against each other
as economic rivals, each with its own external barriers, rules of origin
and other instruments of protection. 04 At this moment in history,
however, when both North and South seem open to inter-continental
integration to an unprecedented degree, this approach seems exactly
contrary to that which circumstances demand.
4.

The Need for Alternative Approaches

None of the approaches to economic integration currently being
pursued in the Americas is well-suited to achieving the goal of hemi-

spheric integration within a reasonable time. What is more, the more
remote this goal remains-the more the nations of the Americas rely
102 See Chile Intends to Seek Membership in MERCOSUR, ForeignMinister Says, supra note
27, at 911; MERCOSUR Ministers Express Support for Trade Accord Covering All South
America, BBC Summ. of World Broadcasts, Mar. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File; MERCOSUR Envisages Entry to NAFTA as a Bloc, Wider South American Integration, BBC Summ. of World Broadcasts, Mar. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,

Curnws File.
103 William R. Long, Latin American Leaders Fly in Formation,L.A. TiaEs, June 25, 1994, at
A2.
104 Such a development would also make life very uncomfortable for Mexico.
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on devices like bilateral agreements and sub-regional blocs-the more
likely it is that American integration will conflict with the principles
and rules of the multilateral economic system.
What, though, are the alternatives? It would be theoretically possible to move immediately to consideration of a Western Hemisphere
or American Free Trade Area. Realistically, however, this option is
clearly premature. Many nations in the Hemisphere have not yet attained the degree of internal liberalization and reform needed to participate in such an arrangement; in addition, given the current
situation, a significant amount of groundwork would be necessary
before such discussions could even begin. And at present, with the
dominant emphasis on regional and sub-regional blocs, there does not
even exist a hemispheric forum-other than the OAS-in which these
issues can be addressed.
This seems to be a discouraging state of affairs. We believe, however, that encouraging lessons can be drawn from recent experiences
with economic integration in Asia and the Pacific Basin. As in the
Western Hemisphere, the rapidly growing nations of the Asia-Pacific
region are experimenting with new forms of integration while continuing to support the multilateral system. Asia, too, wishes to reap the
benefits of integration on an efficient scale; it too must deal with nations of vastly different size, structure, and level of development, as
well as a growing number of sub-regional groupings, including
ASEAN and several small "growth triangles."'1 5 Finally, the nations
of the Pacific also hope to use economic integration to achieve significant political goals, such as keeping the United States enmeshed in
Asia-Pacific economic affairs and defusing United States-Japan trade
conflicts by embedding them in a context of regional cooperation.0 6
The Asian experience demonstrates that, in an era of transition like
that now prevailing in the Western Hemisphere, modest institutional
modalities can be both workable and valuable steps on the path to
more complete integration. The following section outlines how one
such approach, manifested in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
forum, or APEC, might benefit the Western Hemisphere.
105 The best-known growth triangle is an informal one, including Hong Kong, the Republic of
China and the liberalized southern China provinces of Guandong and Fujian. Another successful triangle is made up of Singapore, the Malaysian state of Johor, and the Indonesian province
of Riau. A growth triangle liberalizes the flow of trade and investment among its members and
also acts as a joint base for foreign investment; both developments lead to the creation of a small
integrated market that spans several countries, while often, as the above examples suggest, ignoring national boundaries. See generally Abbott & Bowman, supra note 80, at 192-206.
106 Abbott & Bowman, supra note 80, at 212, 216-17.
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AN AMERICAN FORUM FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION

APEC was formed in 1989.1°7 The government of Japan played a
significant role in originating the concept, but Australia took the lead
in calling together twelve nations of the Asia-Pacific region to found
the organization. 108 Membership has since been expanded, both
within Asia proper 0 9 and within the Western Hemisphere. Mexico
became a member of APEC in 1993, during the summit meeting of
Asia-Pacific heads of government held in Seattle, Washington; Chile
was admitted to membership at the November 1994 summit meeting
in Jakarta, Indonesia. Since the United States and Canada are original members, APEC already spans North America and Latin America
and is familiar throughout much of the Hemisphere.
APEC is an unusual international organization. To date, at least,
it has remained informal, with no written treaty or other constitutive
document spelling out institutional structures, rules or procedures. In
addition, APEC is institutionally decentralized. Although it has a
small permanent secretariat, there is no central decision making body.
Rather, the members of APEC reach agreement by consensus, with
decisions implemented directly or through informal working groups
staffed by APEC members. 110 Because it effectively gives each member a veto power, this structure makes aggressive action by APEC
unlikely. Indeed, APEC as an organization is not an independent actor; it can do nothing that is not supported by a consensus of its members. APEC's value, then, is as a forum for consultation. Its informal
and consensual nature encourages broad membership in the organization: Few if any governments see APEC as a threat to sovereignty.
Another important structural feature, from the point of view of
the Western Hemisphere, is that the members of APEC have agreed
that it will not supersede or have any formal role in any of the other
regional or sub-regional organizations within the Asia-Pacific region.
Such organizations include the Pacific Economic Cooperation Confer107 See Abbott & Bowman, supra note 80, at 208-25 for a more detailed discussion of APEC.
108 The twelve original members were Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States.
APEC Meeting in Singapore Said to Establish Group as Major Forum for Region's Interests, 7
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1245 (Aug. 8, 1990).
109 The three Chinas-the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, and the Republic of
China (referred to within APEC as Chinese Taipei )-were admitted in 1991. Fact-Sheet: AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 4 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 555 (1993). Papua New Guinea
was admitted in 1993. Asia-Pacific Leaders Make Commitments to Freer Trade, GATT, Another
Meeting, 10 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1978 (Nov. 24, 1993).
110 Abbott & Bowman, supra note 80, at 213-15.
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ence (PECC)"', the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), the East Asian Economic Caucus, and NAFTA. Instead,
APEC will attempt to coordinate its activities with those of the latter
organizations.' 12 PECC, for example, has already established a complementary role: PECC task forces, which concentrate on specific areas of economic cooperation in the region, are participating in
APEC's working groups, and PECC itself has become an observer at
APEC meetings."'
What could be gained by establishing such an apparently toothless organization within the Western Hemisphere? We submit that an
organization modeled on APEC could help the nations of the Americas make significant progress toward economic integration on a hemispheric scale, consistent with the norms of the multilateral system,
while helping to avoid some of the pitfalls of the approaches currently
being followed. Such an organization might be called the American
Forum for Economic Cooperation, or in Spanish, Foro Americano por
la Corporaci6n Econ6mica (FACE). FACE would serve several important functions.
First, FACE's mere existence would have important symbolic
consequences. While symbols are not actions, their political effects
should not be underrated.
(a) The existence of FACE would symbolize the whole of the
Americas, the Western Hemisphere, as the relevant region for the
consideration of economic cooperation, including economic integration. This symbolism might not be as important as in the case of
APEC. There, formation of the organization actually helped cement
the identity of a distinct Asia-Pacific region; in the Western Hemisphere, the OAS and the other elements of the inter-American system
already serve that function. It is far from clear, however, that the
Western Hemisphere is seen as the relevant unit for purposes of eco111 PECC was formed in 1980. It has a different, and in some ways broader, membership than
APEC. For example, its members include Russia and Peru. PECC is also a consultative organization, but involves both the public and private sectors. Member state delegations include scholars and business people as well as government officials, and even they attend in their personal
capacities. PECC has not evolved into a stronger organization, as its founders hoped it would.
Currently, PECC's main activity is sponsoring task forces that study particular economic
problems and make recommendations to member governments. See Abbott & Bowman, supra
note 80, at 206-08.
112 See Abbott & Bowman, supra note 80, at 214.
113 Fact Sheet: APEC Working Groups, 4 DEP'T ST. DIsPATcH 837 (1993) (Tourism Working
Group); see also Donald Crone, Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganization of the Pacific
PoliticalEconomy, 45 WoRu Po" 501, 523 (1993).
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nomic cooperation; as discussed above, most activities in this area
have taken place on a sub-regional or continental basis.
(b) Membership in FACE would symbolize the member states'
commitment to cooperation and integration on a hemispheric scale.
Currently, economic cooperation in the Western Hemisphere is
threatened by a series of centrifugal forces. The United States is preoccupied with domestic problems and regularly distracted by foreign
policy crises around the globe. Mexico is adjusting to its new role in
NAFTA, while dealing with pressing domestic problems of its own.
The members of the sub-regional economic organizations in Latin
America are preoccupied with their own local legal, economic and
political problems. Participation in FACE would tangibly engage the
reputations of all these states in support of the hemispheric ideal,
making it more difficult for them to ignore it in their actions on economic policy.
(c) FACE would symbolize the equality of nations in the Hemisphere. By organizing FACE as a decentralized, consensual body,
each member state, regardless of size, would be treated as an equal
partner. Equality of membership would stand in contrast not only to
the more or less exclusive subregional organizations but also to the
bilateral United States framework agreements, which tend to function
as fora in which representatives of the United States set standards for
and make demands upon the smaller states of Latin America. A
structure of equality might slow progress in the short run, but it would
lay a much stronger foundation for hemispheric economic unity in the
long run.
Second, in addition to its symbolic importance, FACE would provide an ongoing institutional framework within which the nations of
the Americas could work toward hemispheric integration. At first,
FACE might serve as a forum for the exploration of common interests
and the development of formal or informal modes of cooperation. As
broader hemispheric relations developed, FACE could become a hemispheric forum for more substantive negotiations on the modalities of
integration. In the meanwhile, FACE might also allow economic disputes within the Hemisphere-particularly North-South disputesand conflicts between sub-regional organizations to be dealt with quietly in a common institutional context, informed by common interests
and principles.
Third, a broad, hemispheric organization like FACE could embody a set of integrative, cooperative principles, probably quite general at this early stage, within which its members would agree to work.
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A FACE statement of principles might establish the goal of broader
hemispheric integration; encourage liberalization of trade, technology
transfer, and investment; discourage regional groupings from taking
measures that would impede hemispheric integration, while encouraging them to consolidate or cooperate in other ways; and set out the
ultimate economic goals toward which its members should aspire.
On the latter point, APEC is a unique and important precedent,
because it has adopted the principle of "open regionalism": working
toward liberalization and greater integration inside the region while at
the same time attempting to lower barriers to trade and investment
with the rest of the world. 114 This concept is completely at odds with
traditional Latin American approaches, like the early ANCOM integration program that envisioned the Andean Group as a distinct, welldefined market within which trade could be liberalized and industries
allocated, while trade and investment with the outside world were
strictly controlled. In APEC, open regionalism was adopted for two
principal reasons: First, because of the risk that more exclusive forms
of integration might lead Western nations to respond by closing their
markets to the products of the export-dependent Asia-Pacific economies, and second, to attract much-needed investment from developed
countries."' Both of these rationales are equally applicable to the
rapidly growing economies of Latin America. What is more, the concept of open regionalism would go a long way toward keeping Western Hemisphere economic integration consistent with the multilateral
system. Indeed, as the APEC Eminent Persons Group put it, "any
regional enterprise governed by the principle of open regionalism will,
by definition, be a building block for and contribute to a freer global
economy."

1 16

114 See, e.g., NORMAN D. PALMER, THE NEw REGIONALISM IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 2-5
(1991); Peter Drysdale & Ross Garnaut, The Pacific: An Application of a General Theory of
Economic Integration,in PACIFIC DYNAMISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM 183,
186 (C. Fred Bergsten & Marcus Noland eds., 1993); Declarationon an APEC Trade and Investment Framework,4 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 832 (1993) (joint statement of APEC leaders at Seattle
summit, proclaiming determination to work through APEC toward the further development of
open regionalism and market-driven economic interdependence in the Asia Pacific region)
[hereinafter Declarationon APEC]. See also APEC, ACHIEVING THE APEC VISION: FREE AND
OPEN TRADE IN THE ASIA PACIFIC 2-3,29-35 (1994) (Second Report of APEC Eminent Persons
Group).
115 Abbott & Bowman, supra note 80, at 211, 215-16.
116 APEC, supra note 114, at 2-3. See Declarationon APEC, supra note 115, at 832 (trade
liberalization must be made through consultation in a manner consistent with the principles of
GATT and open regionalism); Abbott & Bowman, supra note 80, at 222 (open regionalism a
potentially important contribution to multilateral system).
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Fourth, FACE would provide a setting in which member states
could seek to persuade, and even subtly pressure, others to conform to
the principles of the organization, including open regionalism.
Through such an interactive dialogue, FACE could be a moderating
and integrative influence on developments within the Hemisphere, including both North and Latin America. This influence could affect
both individual states, as members of FACE, and the various regional
and sub-regional economic organizations in the Western Hemisphere.
Although neither FACE nor these organizations would have any official role in each other's affairs, this separation would be wholly artificial, since the same states would be members of both. In effect, then,
FACE would function as an institutional matrix, bringing together the
states and economic organizations of the region for an ongoing dialogue informed by common principles.
Fifth, FACE could establish a concrete work program that would
strengthen the foundation for hemispheric integration. Again, APEC
provides a precedent. Its working groups try to eliminate barriers to
economic activity and reduce the transactions costs of doing business
in the Asia-Pacific region. Because of the informal, consensual nature
of the organization, however, the working groups eschew politically
charged issues and focus on technical matters. For example, APEC
groups are currently working to promote the exchange of trade and
business information among its members, increase the efficiency of
energy use in the region, improve regional transportation networks,
and modernize telecommunications systems. 117 Interestingly, the
OAS Charter refers to similar programs in connection with economic
integration, mentioning technical and financial cooperation in general, and referring specifically to coordination of transportation and
communications." 8 Programs like these, while technical in nature,
could be quite significant and would be an important way to advance
regional integration without external barriers.
Sixth, FACE could help coordinate the collection, generation and
dissemination of information, both about the kinds of problems that
face businesses in the region and about member state policies and actions. This kind of information would greatly improve the ability of
FACE itself and of its member states to address the real economic
issues of the region. Some of the problems discovered will be techni117 Abbott & Bowman, supra note 80, at 220 n. 141.
118 Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 96, 2 U.S.T. at 2424, 119
U.N.T.S. at 20, 23. The Charter also calls for the development of multinational development

projects. 2 U.S.T. at 2424, 119 U.N.T.S. at 22.

Economic Integration in the Americas
14:493 (1994)

cal; they can be approached through harmonization or other procedures in working groups. Others will be political; these can be
discussed preliminarily within FACE, laying the groundwork for more
substantive negotiations on integration. In all cases, better information will improve the ability of FACE to function as a forum for dialogue and jawboning.
As an informal organization, FACE could be set up quite quickly
and easily once states agreed on its value. Its members would not
need to divert energy from other pursuits to negotiate the details of a
FACE treaty. FACE would not entail significant additional costs. It
would be highly desirable to establish some form of secretariat for the
sake of efficiency and symbolism alike, but elaborate central institutions would be unnecessary, indeed counter to the nature of the organization. Although the OAS has not previously been a major player
in matters of regional integration, that organization might be willing
to perform all or some of the functions of a FACE secretariat, especially since the new Secretary General of the OAS, Cesar Gaviria Trujillo, former President of Colombia, has been a strong supporter of
regional integration." 9
V.

CONCLUSION

The nations of the Western Hemisphere are presented with a
unique set of circumstances, more conducive to the economic integration of the hemisphere than at any time this century. This is an oppor-

tunity that should not be missed, for both economic and political
reasons. Yet it is by no means certain that the opportunity will con-

tinue to be available indefinitely. It is important, then, to take cooperative action, to do so at the hemispheric level, and to do so with
dispatch. As in all areas of international cooperation, the best way to
structure cooperative relationships so that they can withstand the inevitable centrifugal forces of domestic and international politics is
through the creation of an ongoing international institution.

In the case of the Americas, however, hard political and economic realities intrude. With large disparities in level of development
and political stability, the nations of Latin America are not equally
ready for economic integration; some will not be ready for many
119 See Maria Isabel Garcia, Americas: A Gaviria Victory Could End Cuba's Isolation, Inter
Press Service, Mar. 26, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; Ibero-American
Summit; Colombian PresidentCriticisesAgriculturalProtectionismin Developed Countries,BBC
Summ. of World Broadcasts, July 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (as-

serting his belief that regional integration can help end poverty and unemployment).
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years. A hemispheric organization, then, cannot require too much at
the outset, yet must be structured to nurture liberalization, harmonization and the ideal of hemispheric integration, probably for some
time. None of the institutions already in existence are appropriate for
this role.
Viewed as a single institution, NAFTA and the related process of
affiliation or membership is too demanding in the short run and does
little to nurture integration in the long run. The United States framework agreements supplement NAFTA and are designed to perform
this very function, but they are too one-sided and insufficiently hemispheric in their orientation to be fully satisfactory. None of the other
regional and sub-regional organizations in the Americas are designed
to achieve hemispheric integration; at best they aspire to continental
scale. The OAS could be the answer, but its experience in economic
integration is limited, and it is viewed in many circles as an unnecessarily large and costly bureaucracy.
The organization we propose is designed to reconcile these conflicting demands. We do not wish to oversell what FACE could
accomplish, however: It could move no faster than the economic restructuring and political will of its members would allow. Yet FACE
would manifest and serve as the locus of a concrete process of hemispheric integration, informed by common principles, in which all nations of the Americas could participate and in which all would be
committed to participate. Especially considering the ease and low
cost with which it could be established and maintained, such an organization would make an important contribution to the economic future
of the Western Hemisphere.
ADDENDUM

The Summit of the Americas
After this Article was written, but before it could be published,
the Summit of the Americas was held in Miami on December 9-11,
1994. The leaders of all the democratically elected governments in the
Hemisphere adopted a Declaration of Principles (Declaration) and a
Plan of Action (Plan).' These documents reflect highly significant decisions on the economic integration of the Hemisphere, and include
1 Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, Dec. 13, 1994, available in NEXIS, News
Library, Drexel File. Declaration and Plan are also reprinted in BusiNEss AMERICA (December
1994), the journal of the U.S. Dep't of Commerce International Trade Administration.
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broad undertakings on the development of democracy, the eradication
of poverty and discrimination, and environmental protection.
In the economic area, the highlight of the Summit was a commitment to begin immediately to construct a Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA), under which barriers to trade and investment
would be progressively eliminated throughout the Hemisphere and
common standards on such matters as unfair trade practices, intellectual property protection and competition policy would be established
by agreement. The Plan set in motion a series of consultations and an
initial program of research and scheduled two follow-up ministerial
meetings for 1995 and 1996. The leaders resolved to complete the
FTAA by the year 2005, and to achieve concrete progress by the turn
of the century.
The Summit documents embrace most of the themes espoused in
this Article, including the two broad principles we propose to guide
economic policy in the Americas: primacy of the multilateral system
and integration on a hemispheric scale. The economic section of the
Plan begins with a pledge of support for multilateral rules and disciplines, calling for rapid implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements and continuing negotiations in the World Trade Organization
and other fora; and it envisions free trade and economic integration
throughout the Americas. The principal disappointment in this regard
is the failure of the Summit documents to embrace the policy of open
regionalism prominent in APEC. The FTAA is apparently conceived
of as a discriminatory free trade area, one that will not raise barriers
to trade and investment with non-members but that will not lower
them either, except through multilateral negotiations.
Our Article suggested that it would be premature to move immediately to hemispheric free trade and economic integration, both because of the differences among the American states in their levels of
development and liberalization and because of the amount of preliminary work needed. Against this background, the decision to commit
to the creation of the FTAA by a specific date was something of a
surprise. In essence, however, the Summit leaders agreed with our
position, setting a target date a full ten years hence and recognizing
that most concrete steps toward integration would take place during
the second half of that period.
The Article also suggested that, in the interim, important progress toward eventual integration could be made through programs to
gather, evaluate and disseminate information; exploratory consulta-
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tions and negotiations; and practical work programs. The Summit
documents also focus on these three tasks.
First, the Plan calls for a program of research about the commonalities and differences in existing subregional arrangements and other
relevant, though undefined, regional data. This research is entrusted
to the OAS Special Committee on Trade, with support to be sought
from the Inter-American Development Bank and the United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Second, the Plan calls for inter-state consultations, beginning immediately. These discussions are also intended to consider the existing agreements in the Hemisphere, but here the focus is to be on
ways of improving the existing disciplines and "bringing them together."2 As a strategic matter, this suggests that the leaders are envisioning a process whereby increasingly harmonized sub-regional
arrangements are eventually merged into a single FrAA.
Third, the Plan sets out work programs in several important areas. The greatest attention is given to infrastructure development and
energy policy. The energy work program is to be integrated with the
Partnership for Sustainable Energy Use, one of several Partnershipseach of which is actually a series of commitments and a work program-focusing on environmental protection. (As this suggests, the
Summit documents are notable for their effort to consider economic
and environmental policies simultaneously, and to make them "mutually supportive."3 ) At this stage, most of the work programs are quite
general; one would hope that consultations lead to more specific cooperative projects.
The principal differences between the decisions taken at the Summit and the recommendations of this Article, then, concern the institutional framework for Hemispheric integration. The thesis of our
Article was that the process of integration would be most effectively
pursued through an institution that was hemispheric in scope and
dedicated to hemispheric economic issues, like APEC in the Asia-Pacific region. The Clinton Administration, however, took a different
approach. According to Lawrence Summers, Under Secretary of the
Treasury for International Affairs, who coordinated the economic aspects of the Summit, "The Administration thought it was best to avoid
the proliferation of organizations and to rely on existing institutions to

2 Plan, part II, section 9, "Immediate Action Agenda."

3 Plan, part II, section 9(2).
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work for the economic integration of the
Hemisphere. This approach
4
governments."
other
by
was supported
Under the Plan, the integration process will be pursued in three
institutional fora, or groups of fora. First, as noted above, the OAS
Special Committee on Trade is to conduct research with the aid of
other institutions. The Committee is a hemispheric body, but not a
particularly prominent or powerful one, and its tasks appear to be
largely ministerial. Second, consultations on blending current subregional arrangements are to be held, at least initially, "under existing
trade and investment fora."5 The existing fora, however, are mainly
the bilateral United States Trade and Investment Councils and the
governing bodies of the various subregional groups, which our article
suggests are not particularly appropriate venues for issues of hemispheric significance. Third, overall guidance for the process is to come
from meetings of the hemisphere's trade ministers; two meetings are
already scheduled. Ministerial meetings are hemispheric and powerful, but they are also ad hoc; they do not create the sense of commitment and permanence that a dedicated forum could provide.
The need for an institutional framework like that which we recommend stems from the importance and complexity of the process of
integration and the fragility of the commitment to liberalization in
some countries of the Americas. A dedicated hemispheric forum
would signify commitment and give visibility and continuity to the
process. The many symbolic and practical advantages of such an arrangement are spelled out in detail in the Article. While the Summit
has produced many praiseworthy accomplishments, we continue to
believe that better institutional approaches are available. As the process of integration proceeds, moreover, the need for such approaches
may become even greater. We continue to urge the leaders of the
Hemisphere to consider alternative forms of institutionalization, and
we would not be at all surprised to see institutional forms like those
we recommend emerging before 2005.

4 Letter from Lawrence H. Summers to Professor Kenneth W. Abbott, (Dec. 20, 1994) (on
file with author).
5 Plan, Part II, section 6.

